The
memetic basis of religion
Mario.Vaneechoutte@rug.ac.be
Published
as Correspondence Letter in Nature 365: 290. 1993.
(Title
given by Nature Editors)
Sir,
The
correspondence of B. D. Josephson (1) reminds of an earlier contribution by A.
Baidins (2). Both authors want to find a way to study religion scientifically
and suggest that this might be achieved through the assumption that the ability
to experience religous feelings may be encoded in the genes. Religion than is
selected because 'the central theme of religion is the attempt to maximize
human goodness and 'because societies in which this potential is actualized ...
will tend to function more harmoniously and more efficiently' (1) or because
'Some humans are dimly aware of another dimension in this Universe... which
helps them make more constructive decisions than those people lacking such a
faculty' (2).
In my
opinion one should be very careful not to confuse different 'levels', like
atoms, genes, organisms, intelligence, and thoughts. Others, like R. Penrose,
make an even bigger leap, trying to explain mental events with quantum physics.
I prefer
to look at religion as an emergent characteristic, which can only arise after
other levels have comen to full development. Looking at it this way, religion
has to do with the confrontation of our animal emotionality with our human
superintelligence. I will try to briefly expose the elements of this
hypothesis.
Evolution
has conceived animals as organisms which tend to reach what could be called a
'hormonal equilibrium', which we experience as happiness. Through performing
certain tasks - those tasks like feeding, fleeing and sexual behaviour, which
finally have as the single purpose to multiply the genes present - the animal
is rewarded: it experiences joy, relief, satisfaction, 'happiness'. For genes,
who have to program organisms, living in a completely different world (at a
different 'level') this is an elegant, effective and universally applicable
solution. The molecular mechanisms for this neuro-endrocrinological master
regulation system are being unravelled quickly. Thus, regarding animals and
humans as basically emotional beings is the first cornerstone in this
hypothesis, necessary for the building up of the second element, intelligence.
The ability to enjoy and to fear underlies the evolutionary development of
intelligence. Animals and children learn through joy and fear, and experience
emotional reward when making new discoveries.
The
selective advantage of intelligence, which develops independantly and increases
continuously in different animal phyla and families - illustrating that there
must be a strong selective advantage, is easy to see: intelligence allows to
store information from the past to tackle more efficiently current situations.
Human
superintelligence however passed beyond a treshold: its tremendous associations
making capacity leads to unlimited phantasy and allows to pierce into the
future. This property leads to a fundamental problem: animals fall asleep after
a good meal or feel relieved after escaping a predator, but humans loose their
ability to enjoy fully the present state of happiness since they keep bothering
whether they will find food tomorrow or whether they will escape next time. And
they continue to do so on every possible moment for all kinds of events (will
our children grow happily, will I pass my exam, will I see her again, what will
happen when I die). For humans, instant animal anger and joy turns into endless
fear and longing. Since mental events can strongly influence
neuro-endocrinological functioning (and vice versa), humans become uncertain
and are prone to depressions.
From this
point of view one can begin to hypothesize about possible human behaviours as
solutions to this problem.
Logically
one can do two things: one can try to solve the problems caused by our excess
ability to make associations by more thinking and by constructing thoughts or
theories which can bring relief, or one can try to stop thinking (which is very
hard to do). The first solution gives raise to ideas which one could call
'memes', a term that has been revived by R. Dawkins. Memes then are those
thought constructions which can supply an individual with certainty about its
own fate. A memetic selection pressure can be inferred from this: those
thoughts which apply to the above described criterium will be selected from the
thought pool and will be succesfully distributed - horizontally - into
different brains. (By the way: the fact that culture, including memes, can be
transferred horizontally makes that it cannot act on societies and individuals
the way genetic selection pressures do.) One can study meme selection, meme
classification and memetic evolution. E.g. memes have a high adaptation
capacity: just consider the changes western religious doctrines have went
through to adapt to the findings of science.
So
religion could be considered as a meme. Gods, divine powers, or holy trees are
believed to let us influence the future. Indeed religion helps individuals to
function more efficiently, as Baidins suggested (2). However this is not
because some individuals have some genetic ability for religion, but because
religion is a meme. Also in opposition with Josephson and Baidins, I not
consider altruism as the essence of religion, but its memetic property as
defined above. Initially people tried to influence gods and powers - and thus
the future and their own fate - with offerings, and only later things like
promoting altruistic behaviour and rules for social organisation were grafted
onto religion. Even then the essence of religion remains the influencing of the
future: the major reason to behave according to the rules is that one can
propitiate the deity by doing so.
Another
interesting meme, which could be regarded as co-evoluting with religion, is
anthropocentrism. Anthropocentrism is a meme because it provides an individual
with self confirmation by the assurance that he/she belongs to a superb
(divine) species.
Is science
a meme? Astronomy certainly was from the very beginning of cultural history.
Astronomy allows to foresee future events like eclipses or seasonal weather
changes. That might be the reason why astronomy is the only scientific branch
which was developed to a high degree early in cultural history and
independantly in different cultures. It brought power to those who were able to
make the necessary calculations and it is was worth enough to erect enormous -
scientific - measurement constructions. Observe that priests were also
astronomists in many cultures.
Scientific
reasoning itself to be accepted as a possibility to bring more certainty, had
to await
The
nonmemetic way to tackle the problem is to stop thinking, because our excess of
thinking ability is one of the fundaments of the problem. No one wants to
eliminate the other fundament of the problem (feelings) - because emotion
developed earlier and is more essential to our functioning? Elimination of our
mental activity allows us to reach directly the animal happiness state. Again
two major approaches can be distinghuished.
Buddhism,
generally not considered as a religion - in contrast to how Josephson sees it
(1), provides us with techniques to do so. Meditation e.g. can produce a happy
feeling of unawareness, the not-knowing state of animals.
Materialistic
nonmemetic solutions become possible in societies of plenty. People try to stop
thinking by emphasizing the essential (animal) needs: they try to directly
stimulate their pleasure centers with all kinds of chemicals or they try to
experience joy via the evolutionarily developed channels by exaggerating e.g.
feeding, sexual or self confirmation behaviour.
All of
this is only a hypothesis, but one which allows to study human behaviour,
including religion, scientifically and interdisciplinary. It might give us an
opportunity to approach very different kinds of human behaviour (from killing
for ideas to driving with cars too big) with a single key: we are doing all of
this because evolution made us naturally unhappy organisms, struggling with the
emotional consequences of our excess of associative capacity.
1.
Josephson, B.D. 1993. Nature 362: 583.
2.
Baidins, A. 1990. Nature 346: 693.